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TOO DARN BAD: HOW THE SUPREME COURT’S CLASS ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE HAS
UNDERMINED ARBITRATION
By
Adam Raviv*
In recent Supreme Court cases addressing the validity of class action waivers in
arbitration agreements, arbitration nominally won the battle. But it lost the war. In 2011,
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempted a California state rule that prohibited companies from
including an arbitration clause with a class action waiver in their customer contracts.1
Two years later, in American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court held that a
class action waiver in an arbitration agreement does not prevent consumers from enjoying
“effective vindication” of their legal rights under federal antitrust law, and therefore is
enforceable under the FAA.2
Not surprisingly, the Concepcion and Italian Colors decisions have inspired a
great deal of commentary.3 Whatever their views on whether the cases were correctly
decided, most observers agreed that the decisions at least promoted arbitration.4 In doing
*

Counsel, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP. The opinions expressed in this article are the
author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of his employer. The author’s firm, but not the
author himself, took part in some of the cases discussed in this article. An earlier version of a portion of
this article was presented at the New Voices from New Professionals panel at the 106 th Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law.
1

See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).

2

Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) and Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064
(2013), addressing the scope of an arbitrator’s authority to order class arbitration. However, neither case
addressed whether a class action waiver was enforceable, because the governing contract in each case was
silent as to class proceedings.
3

See, e.g., Gary Born & Claudio Salas, The United States Supreme Court and Class Arbitration: A Tragedy
of Errors, 2012 J. DISPUTE RESOL. 21 (2012); David Korn & David Rosenberg, Concepcion’s ProDefendant Biasing of the Arbitration Process: The Class Counsel Solution, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1151
(2013); Harvard Law Review Assoc., The Supreme Court 2012 Term Leading Cases – American Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 127 HARV. L. REV. 278 (2013); S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration
“Change the Nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV.
NEGOTIATION L. REV. 201 (2012); Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the
Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069 (2011); Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration
After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 767 (2012); Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors,
14 GREEN BAG 2d 375 (2010); Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1189 (2011); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 128 (2011); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third
Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323 (2011); Colin P. Marks, The Irony of AT&T v. Concepcion, 87 IND. L.J.
SUPPLEMENT 31, 43-45 (2012); Frank Blechschmidt, All Alone in Arbitration: AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion and the Substantive Impact of Class Action Waivers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2012).
4

With respect to Concepcion, see Catherine M. Amirfar & David W. Rivkin, Current Challenges to
Consumer Arbitration in the United States: Much Ado About Nothing For International Arbitration?, ARB.
REV. AMERICAS (2012) (explaining that Concepcion “preserve[s] the federal policy of promoting
arbitration”); Jennifer B. Poppe & Alithea Z. Sullivan, Could the Supreme Court’s Enforcement of
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so, they reflected the Court’s claim that its decisions furthered a “national policy favoring
arbitration.”5
This article questions that conclusion. In fact, although the Court’s recent class
arbitration decisions have nominally “favored” arbitration by upholding particular
arbitration provisions, in fact the rulings may ultimately undermine the use of arbitration
as an efficient, flexible means of resolving disputes, both in the U.S. and internationally.
In particular, these decisions: (1) undersold the efficiency benefits of class arbitration,
thereby promoting inefficient piecemeal proceedings, (2) made it likely that fewer rather
than more claims will be arbitrated, (3) incorrectly claimed that arbitration is
inappropriate and undesirable in high-stakes cases, (4) denigrated the abilities and
expertise of arbitrators, (5) made it possible that certain arbitration agreements will be
less enforceable in the international context than domestically, (6) signaled a very narrow
view of proper arbitration to the rest of the world, (7) prompted a legislative backlash that
could ultimately lead to far more limited use of arbitration, (8) prompted a backlash
among federal regulators to protect certain types of class actions, creating an ironic and
unwarranted gap between particular class actions and all others, and (9) induced many
lower courts to try to limit the application of the Supreme Court’s rulings.
I.

THE CASES
A. Concepcion

Vincent and Liza Concepcion were aggrieved by a tax charge imposed by the
corporate predecessor of AT&T Mobility and filed a complaint in the United States
Arbitration in Concepcion Reverberate in the Securities Litigation Sphere?, 8 SEC. LITIG. REP. (Sept.
2011), at 2 (referring to “Concepcion’s pro-arbitration holding”); Nixon Peabody, Class Action Alert (Mar.
12, 2012) (referring to the “pro-arbitration message from AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion”), available at
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/Ninth_Circuit_applies_Concepcion; Dirk W. de Roos & Russell O. Stewart,
Legal Trends and Best Practices in Class Arbitration, 40 COLO. LAW. 47, 52 (2011) (“Concepción is a proarbitration decision”); Meredith Goldich, Throwing Out the Threshold: Analyzing the Severability Doctrine
Under Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1673, 1676 n.13 (2011) (explaining that in
Concepcion, “[t]he Court extended the pro-arbitration trend”).
With respect to Consumer Financial Services Group, Italian Colors, see Pro-Arbitration Ruling Likely
from Supreme Court, BALLARD SPAHR LLP LEGAL ALERTS (Feb. 28, 2013), available at
http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2013-02-28-pro-arbitration-ruling-likely-fromsupreme-court.aspx; Kim Rinehart et al., Supreme Court Update: American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant (12-133) and Descamps v. United States (11-9540), WIGGIN & DANA (Jun. 21, 2013) (“The
Court continued its march of pro-arbitration decisions in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant”), available at http://www.wiggin.com/14425; Aubrey Holland, et al., Supreme Court Votes
Pro-Arbitration Once Again and Upholds Class Arbitration Waiver, ORICK EMPL. L. & LITIG. BLOG (Jun.
26, 2013), available at http://blogs.orrick.com/employment/2013/06/26/supreme-court-votes-proarbitration-once-again-and-upholds-class-arbitration-waiver/; Christian R. Urresti, Arbitration Clauses in
Corporate Bylaws: Forestalling Costly and Burdensome Shareholder Litigation, THE NETWORK: BUSINESS
AT BERKELEY LAW (Dec. 13, 2013) http://thenetwork.berkeleylawblogs.org/2013/12/13/arbitration-clausesin-corporate-bylaws-forestalling-costly-and-burdensome-shareholder-litigation/ (“Thus, Amex should be
seen as promoting arbitration by eliminating uncertainty in contracting and removing a barrier to efficient
resolution of disputes— a resounding victory for freedom-of-contract principles.”).
5

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443
(2006)).
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District Court for the Southern District of California. This complaint was eventually
consolidated into a larger putative class action against AT&T Mobility alleging false
advertising and fraud in connection with the sales tax.6
In March 2008, AT&T Mobility moved to compel individual arbitration of the
Concepcions’ claims.7 In their cellular phone contract, the parties “agree[d] to arbitrate
any and all disputes and claims . . . arising out of or relating to this Agreement.” 8 The
contract also provided that claims must be brought in the parties’ individual capacity, and
not as part of any class proceeding. In opposition to the motion to compel, the
Concepcions argued that the arbitration clause—in particular, the prohibition on bringing
claims as part of a class—was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable under
California law.9
The District Court sided with the Concepcions, holding that the class action
waiver was unconscionable under state law, based on the California Supreme Court’s
decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court.10 On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that “under California law, the present
arbitration clause is unconscionable and unenforceable.”11
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the phone company’s claim that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempted California’s unconscionability law.12 The Ninth Circuit held
that the FAA did not preempt California’s Discover Bank rule because of the so-called
“saving clause” in section 2 of the FAA, which allows for the non-enforcement of
arbitration agreements on “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.”13
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that
California’s Discover Bank rule was preempted by the FAA. Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia observed that section 2 of the FAA “reflect[s] both a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration, and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of
contract.”14 Justice Scalia stated that “our cases place it beyond dispute that the FAA was
designed to promote arbitration.”15

6

Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *2 (S.D.Cal., Aug. 11,
2008) rev’d by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *2.

10

Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005).

11

Laster v. AT&T Mobility, LLC., 584 F.3d 849, 852-59 (9th Cir. 2009).

12

Id.

13

Id. at 852.

14

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (citations omitted).

15

Id.
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Justice Scalia also observed that the FAA’s saving clause “permits agreements to
arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that
derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”16 However,
the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank made clear that the rule against class
action waivers was a generally applicable contract defense, because it “applies equally to
class action litigation waivers in contracts without arbitration agreements as it does to
class arbitration waivers in contracts with such agreements.”17
The general applicability of the Discover Bank rule thus required the Court to
consider whether the FAA preempted the rule for another reason. Justice Scalia
explained that a state law that “prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of
claim . . . is displaced by the FAA. But the inquiry becomes more complex when a
doctrine normally thought to be generally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant here,
unconscionability, is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors
arbitration.”18 He observed that “[a]lthough § 2’s saving clause preserves generally
applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules
that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”19
Justice Scalia concluded that the California Discover Bank rule as applied to
arbitrations with class waivers is a generally applicable rule that nonetheless “interferes
with arbitration” and is therefore preempted.20 Building off the Court’s 2010 decision
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,21 Justice Scalia found that
“[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes
of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”22

16

Id. at 1746 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996)).

17

Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 165-66 (2005).

18

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. A doctrine that is generally applicable on its face but effectively
disfavors arbitration, the Court explained in Perry v. Thomas, is impermissible because it is effectively a
back-door invalidation via a rule that “rel[ies] on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a
state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable.” 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987).
19

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. Notably, the FAA does not actually define what arbitration is. Rather,
as one commentator puts it, the Supreme Court “has taken it upon itself to craft a vision of arbitration and
attribute that vision to the Congress that enacted the FAA.” M.H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It
Need Not and Should Not Be an All or Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289, 310 (2012); see also H.N.
Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1238 (2011) (“[T]he language of the FAA
is simply too indeterminate, and the congressional record leading to its enactment too sparse, to draw any
firm conclusions about its original meaning.”)
20

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750; see also Marks, supra note 4, at 43-45 (explaining how the Concepcion
decision went beyond the principle that “state laws and court-created doctrines may not single out
arbitration provisions for different treatment,” instead holding that a rule against class action waivers
violates the “fundamental attributes of arbitration”).
21

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010).

22

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750.
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B. Italian Colors
In 2013, the Supreme Court revisited the question of class action waivers in
arbitration agreements. This time, the challenge to class waivers was based on federal
rather than state law.
Retail merchants that accepted American Express cards had a contract with the
card issuer that required all disputes between them to be resolved by arbitration, and also
provided that “[t]here shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a
class action basis.”23 Notwithstanding these clauses, the merchant plaintiffs brought a
putative class action in the Southern District of New York, alleging that American
Express had used its monopoly power to force them to pay above-market rates to accept
its cards, in violation of the § 1 of the federal Sherman Act.24
American Express moved to compel arbitration. In opposition, the plaintiffs
submitted a declaration from an economist who estimated that the expert analysis
necessary to prove the antitrust claims would cost “at least several hundred thousand
dollars.”25 This amount would greatly exceed the maximum possible recovery for an
individual plaintiff, which was $38,549.26 The district court granted American Express’s
motion to compel arbitration but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the class
waiver was unenforceable because plaintiffs “would incur prohibitive costs if compelled
to arbitrate under the class action waiver.”27
Over the next three years, the case went through multiple further appeals and
remands in light of developing Supreme Court case law on class arbitration, in the form
of Stolt–Nielsen and Concepcion. But eventually, the Second Circuit came to the same
conclusion as before: the class action waiver was unenforceable because “the cost of
plaintiffs’ individually arbitrating their dispute with Amex would be prohibitive,
effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory protections of the antitrust laws.”28
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and the same five-Justice majority as in
Concepcion reversed the Second Circuit and upheld the class waiver.29 Justice Scalia’s
opinion observed that the Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to “‘rigorously
enforce’”30 arbitration agreements “unless the FAA's mandate has been ‘“overridden by a
23

Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 554 F.3d 300, 315-16 (2d Cir. 2009).

28

In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 667 F.3d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting In re American
Express Merchants’ Litigation, 634 F.3d 187, 196 (2d Cir. 2011).
29

American Express Co. v. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312-13 (2013) (Justice Sotomayor, who was
part of the panel in the initial Second Circuit appeal, recused herself, leaving the remaining three Justices in
the minority).
30

Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221
(1985)).
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contrary congressional command.”’”31 He concluded that “[n]o contrary congressional
command requires us to reject the waiver of class arbitration here,” because “the antitrust
laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”32
The majority pointed out that the federal antitrust laws were enacted decades before
federal class actions were made possible by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.33
The majority also rejected the proposition that the class waiver should be
invalidated because it would “prevent the ‘effective vindication’ of a federal statutory
right,” as it would give plaintiffs “no economic incentive to pursue their antitrust claims
individually in arbitration.”34 The “effective vindication” principle originated in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,35 where the Court observed
that statutory claims such as antitrust claims are arbitrable “so long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”36
Justice Scalia’s Italian Colors opinion acknowledged that “a provision in an arbitration
agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights” would “certainly” be
prohibited by the “effective vindication” requirement.37 He also acknowledged that the
requirement “would perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration
that are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable.”38 But he drew the line at a
provision that would make the effective cost of proving a case exceed the value of the
claim: “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy
does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”39
Justice Scalia pointed out that the earlier result in Concepcion “all but resolves
this case” because it held that the FAA preempted a state law “conditioning enforcement
of arbitration on the availability of class procedure because that law ‘interfere[d] with
fundamental attributes of arbitration.’”40 Concepcion specifically rejected the argument
that class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims “that might otherwise slip through
the legal system.”41
31

Id. (quoting CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012)).

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 2310.

35

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).

36

Id. at 637; see also Gary Born, Challenges to the Validity of Agreements to Arbitrate State-Law Claims
for
the
Public
Benefit,
KLUWER
ARB.
BLOG
(Nov.
5,
2013),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/11/05/challenges-to-the-validity-of-agreements-to-arbitratestate-law-claims-for-the-public-benefit/ (discussing the application of the “effective vindication” principle).
37

American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013).

38

Id. at 2310-11 (citing Green Tree Financial Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)).

39

Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2311.

40

Id. at 2312 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)).
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Justice Kagan’s much-quoted dissent chided the majority for being callous and
disingenuous:
[The arbitration clause between Italian Colors and American
Express] imposes a variety of procedural bars that would make
pursuit of the antitrust claim a fool's errand. So if the arbitration
clause is enforceable, Amex has insulated itself from antitrust
liability—even if it has in fact violated the law. The monopolist
gets to use its monopoly power to insist on a contract effectively
depriving its victims of all legal recourse.
And here is the nutshell version of today's opinion, admirably
flaunted rather than camouflaged: Too darn bad.42
Justice Kagan began her analysis “with an uncontroversial proposition: We would
refuse to enforce an exculpatory clause insulating a company from antitrust liability—
say, ‘Merchants may bring no Sherman Act claims’—even if that clause were contained
in an arbitration agreement.”43 She then moved on to cleverer ways a company might
insulate itself from liability through an arbitration clause, including “an absurd (e.g., oneday) statute of limitations”; or “prohibiting any economic testimony (good luck proving
an antitrust claim without that!)”; or “appoint[ing] as an arbitrator an obviously biased
person—say, the CEO of Amex.”44
Justice Kagan characterized the “effective vindication” principle first established
in Mitsubishi Motors as holding that “[a]n arbitration clause will be enforced only ‘so
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in
the arbitral forum.’”45 In particular, a clause will not be valid “if ‘proceedings in the
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult’ that the claimant ‘will for all practical
purposes be deprived of his day in court.’”46
To support her view that an overly costly arbitral procedure can violate the
“effective vindication” principle, Justice Kagan pointed in particular to the Court’s 2000
decision in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph,47 which indicated that an
arbitration clause could be unenforceable if it imposed “high filing and administrative
fees.”48 Justice Kagan argued that “Randolph gave no hint of distinguishing among the
41

Id. (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753).

42

Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

43

Id.

44

Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2314.

45

Id. (quoting Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).

46

Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632).

47

Green Tree Fin. Corp. - Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).

48

Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. at
90).
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different ways an arbitration agreement can make a claim too costly to bring. Its rationale
applies whenever an agreement makes the vindication of federal claims impossibly
expensive—whether by imposing fees or proscribing cost-sharing or adopting some other
device.”49
Justice Kagan detailed her view of the purpose of the FAA, as furthered by the
effective vindication principle:
What the FAA prefers to litigation is arbitration, not de facto
immunity. The effective-vindication rule furthers the statute's goals
by ensuring that arbitration remains a real, not faux, method of
dispute resolution. With the rule, companies have good reason to
adopt arbitral procedures that facilitate efficient and accurate
handling of complaints. Without it, companies have every
incentive to draft their agreements to extract backdoor waivers of
statutory rights, making arbitration unavailable or pointless.50
II.

NINE WAYS ITALIAN COLORS AND CONCEPCION UNDERMINE ARBITRATION

Various lower courts have cited the Supreme Court’s decisions in Concepcion and
Italian Colors as supporting a “national policy favoring arbitration.”51 But for all their
rhetoric about promoting arbitration, the Court’s class arbitration decisions have actually
undermined arbitration in numerous important ways.
A. The Decisions Promote Inefficiency
In his Concepcion opinion, Justice Scalia emphasized that efficiency is a key—if
not the key—benefit of arbitration. He argued that “[a] prime objective of an agreement
to arbitrate is to achieve streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.”52 In
explaining why a prohibition on class waivers in arbitration agreements interferes with
the purpose of the FAA, Justice Scalia explained that “[t]he point of affording parties
discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined
procedures tailored to the type of dispute. . . . And the informality of arbitral proceedings
is itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.”53

49

Id. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

50

Id. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

51

See, e.g., In re Am. Exp. Merchs’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2012); Gore v. Alltel Commc’ns,
LLC, 666 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 20120); Gray Holdco, Inc. v. Cassady, 654 F.3d 444, 451 (3d Cir.
2011); Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir. 2011); Schiffer v. Slomin’s, Inc.,
970 N.Y.S.2d 856, 860 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. June 26, 2013).
52

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S.
346, 357-58 (2008)).
53

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (citing 14 Penn Plaza, LLC, v. Pytt, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); Mitsubishi v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
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Justice Scalia argued that application of the Discover Bank rule to prohibit
waivers of class arbitration “would frustrate” the FAA’s goal of “efficient and speedy
dispute resolution.”54 He outlined the ways in which “the switch from bilateral to class
arbitration . . . makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate
procedural morass than final judgment.”55
What Justice Scalia’s discussion seemed to forget was that a major reason for the
existence of class proceedings—just like arbitrations—is that they can make the
adjudicatory process more efficient.56 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that
“efficiency and economy . . . is a principal purpose” of class actions.57 Although class
actions by their nature have additional procedural requirements that make them more
complicated than individual cases, in the aggregate, they can promote the efficient
disposition of large numbers of similar claims. In his Concepcion dissent, Justice Breyer
observed that “a single class proceeding is surely more efficient than thousands of
separate proceedings for identical claims. Thus, if speedy resolution of disputes were all
that mattered, then the Discover Bank rule would reinforce, not obstruct, that objective of
the Act.”58
Justice Breyer also argued that “if incentives are at issue, the relevant comparison
is … between class arbitration and judicial class actions.”59 He cited AAA’s amicus brief
in the Court’s 2010 class-arbitration case, Stolt-Nielson, which concluded that “class
arbitration proceedings take more time than the average commercial arbitration, but may
take less time than the average class action in court.”60 Thus, if companies really prefer
class litigation to class arbitration, efficiency is probably not the reason why.

54

Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).

55

Id. at 1751.

56

See, e.g., J.C. Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United States (July 21-22,
2000) (presented at conference: Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective) (“Class actions
can also provide a more efficient way to conduct litigation, eliminating the need to relitigate the common
issues in a large number of individual cases.”).
57

Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974). Justice Scalia also argued that requiring
class proceedings in arbitration “sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality.”
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751. This claim betrays a serious misunderstanding of why parties enter into
arbitration agreements in the first place. Informality is only one of those reasons, and increasingly not the
most important one. Moreover, it is hardly the case that arbitrations are always informal. See, e.g., Born,
supra note 4, at 39-40 (“Arbitrations with a high degree of procedural formality are conducted around the
United States, and the world, every day – if that is what the parties desire and agree upon. Contrary to the
Court’s suggestions, there is nothing inherent in arbitration that excludes formality, motions, or
complexity.”); Strong, supra note 4, at 244 (“[A]rbitration can adopt highly formal procedures mimicking
litigation….”).
58

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1759-60.

59

Id. at 1759.

60

Id. (quoting Brief for Am. Arbitration Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 24, StoltNielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (No. 08-1198), 2009 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 875, at *32 [hereinafter AAA Amicus]).
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Surprisingly, Justice Breyer did not also point out that enhanced efficiency is a
requirement of the federal rule that governs class actions in litigation. Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court should allow a class action to go
forward only if “the court finds that … that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”61 A U.S. court
considering a putative class action can only certify the class if doing do promotes the
efficient disposition of the claims at issue.
This principle is also reflected in arbitral rules for class proceedings. AAA’s class
arbitration rules share Federal Rule 23’s requirement that “[a]n arbitration may be
maintained as a class arbitration” only if “the arbitrator finds … that a class arbitration is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.”62 This requirement has borne out in practice; AAA arbitrators have proven
willing to refuse to certify classes.63 Likewise, the JAMS class arbitration rules expressly
incorporate the “criteria set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(b),”
including the requirement that the arbitrator find that “a class arbitration is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy” before
allowing a class arbitration to proceed.64
Thus, by their own terms, both U.S. courts and arbitral institutions provide for
class proceedings only where they make the resolution of disputes more, rather than less,
efficient. If a goal of arbitrations is to promote efficiency, and class actions promote
efficiency, then shouldn’t class arbitration be extra-efficient?65 Even if it does not quite
combine the best of both worlds, would class arbitration not at least be at least as
expedient as (1) individual arbitration of numerous similar small claims brought by
consumers, and (2) class litigation of the same claims?
Recent developments in mass consumer actions bear this out. Not surprisingly,
the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on class arbitration have not caused plaintiffs’
lawyers to quietly slink away. Plaintiff-side consumer lawyers have enormous financial
incentives to find ways to bring large-scale claims. Thus, when class waivers bar actual
class arbitration or class litigation, plaintiffs’ firms have instead begun to file numerous
identical individual actions against the same company.66 In fact, a nonprofit group and
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65
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web site called “Consumers Count” was formed as a way to “crowdsource” consumer
complaints against companies with class waivers.67 When the number of complaints
against a company reaches a “critical mass,” the matter is referred to an affiliated law
firm which will file individual consumer actions.68
There is little doubt that filing dozens, hundreds, or thousands of individual
arbitrations against the same company would be less efficient than a single class action.
Indeed, most arbitral institutions may not even have the resources to handle such an
endeavor, particularly if the underlying contract – like the contracts in Concepcion and
Italian Colors – does not allow any kind of aggregation, but rather requires separate
written submissions, separate adjudicators, separate testimony, and separate hearings.
But that may be the laborious result when class arbitration is a casualty in the arms race
between plaintiffs’ counsel and the companies they sue.
Moreover, the premise that arbitrations primarily promote efficiency is also
dubious. In fact, growing evidence over the years has called into question whether
arbitration—both domestic and international—really is a cost and time saver.69 Thus,
Justice Scalia’s argument about efficiency seems to have sailed in opposite directions,
both of them dubious—first in claiming that class actions diminish efficiency, and second
in claiming that individual arbitration really is especially efficient.
B. The Decisions Will Lead to Fewer Arbitrations
Another likely result of the recent decisions is that they will lead to fewer
arbitrations. Insofar as more arbitration is a goal of the FAA—and the majority and
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dissent in Italian Colors disputed whether that is so—the likely result of the decisions is
fewer arbitrations.
Toward the end of his Concepcion opinion, Justice Scalia essentially
acknowledged that it was possible that “small-dollar claims” would “slip through the
legal system” if they could not be aggregated into a class.70 However, Justice Scalia
sidestepped the implication of this holding by pointing that it was not a real danger in the
cell phone contract before the Court, because of provisions making individual arbitration
more attractive: “the arbitration agreement provides that AT & T will pay claimants a
minimum of $7,500 and twice their attorney’s fees if they obtain an arbitration award
greater than AT & T’s last settlement offer.”71
However, while Justice Scalia trumpeted the $7,500 payout provision,72 the
majority’s ruling in no way hinged on its existence. Rather, the opinion made clear that
the FAA preempted the Discover Bank rule against class arbitration waivers for the
independent reason that requiring class proceedings undermines the FAA’s proarbitration policy, and “States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the
FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”73 .
The consumer-friendly provisions were obviously included to shield the
agreement from claims that it was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. And in
the wake of Concepcion, some companies apparently did include similar provisions in
their consumer contracts.74 But because the actual result in Concepcion did not depend
on such provisions, if anything, the Concepcion decision made it less necessary for
companies to include sweeteners like the $7,500 clause and the other claimant-friendly
parts of the contract.
The subsequent Italian Colors decision resolved any doubt whether “consumer
friendly” provisions are necessary to ensure the validity of class arbitration waivers.
There, Justice Scalia explained that Concepcion “specifically rejected the argument that
class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims ‘that might otherwise slip through the
legal system.’”75
He left out that his earlier opinion had also argued that the
Concepcions’ claim was unlikely to slip through the system because AT&T’s arbitration
provision gave them a financial incentive to sue individually.
In a footnote in Italian Colors, the majority also rejected the dissent’s suggestion
that adjudication of meritorious claims is a goal of the FAA. Rather, citing Concepcion,
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the majority argued that “the FAA's command to enforce arbitration agreements trumps
any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims. The latter interest, we said
[in Concepcion], is ‘unrelated’ to the FAA. Accordingly, the FAA does, contrary to the
dissent's assertion, favor the absence of litigation when that is the consequence of a classaction waiver.”76 Thus, under the majority’s view, the FAA requires enforcement of
arbitration agreements, even doing so will lead to fewer, not more, arbitrations.
Italian Colors confirms that companies that include class arbitration waivers in
contracts can be confident in the waivers’ validity. And the companies that do include
class waivers in their agreements are legion. A 2013 study by the federal Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, discussed in greater detail below, found 93.9% of arbitration
clauses in credit card agreements clauses – representing 99.9% of credit card loans
outstanding that were subject to arbitration clauses – included terms limiting class
proceedings.77 Similar numbers were found for bank checking account agreements and
prepaid payment cards.78 Likewise, a 2008 study of major American companies’
contracts found that 100% of the consumer arbitration agreements surveyed – 20 out of
20 – included class arbitration waivers.79 Notably, however, another recent empirical
study of franchise agreements found that in the wake of Concepcion, “the predicted
tsunami of arbitral class waivers has not occurred.”80
C. The Decisions Ignore the Attraction of “High Stakes” Arbitration
The majority and dissent in Concepcion clashed over the former’s contention that
“[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation.”81 Justice Scalia
observed that in litigation, class certification decisions and final judgments are subject to
appellate review, while the FAA allows courts to vacate final judgments only on very
narrow grounds.82 He concluded that it was “hard to believe that defendants would bet
the company with no effective means of review.”83 He also noted that class
76
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arbitrations—like class actions—may lead to “‘in terrorem’ settlements” when
companies face “even a small chance of a devastating loss.”84
In response, Justice Breyer argued that this claim “lacks empirical support” and
pointed to reports of several arbitral judgments and settlements worth hundreds of
millions of dollars.85 Justice Scalia countered that these examples were all anecdotal and
not relevant unless “it could be established that the size of the arbitral dispute was
predictable when the arbitration agreement was entered.”86
Neither the majority nor the dissenters actually presented empirical proof of
whether parties resist arbitration in class actions and other high-stakes cases. But as a
general matter, Justice Scalia surely overstated matters to claim that defendants are
unwilling to “bet the company” in arbitration. Multiple commentators have criticized the
majority’s suggestion that arbitration is “ill-suited” for high-stakes disputes.87 Many of
the highest-stake civil disputes in the United States and in the world have proceeded
through arbitration. Moreover, it is hardly the case that the defendants in these cases
were all dragged kicking and screaming into arbitral proceedings when they would have
preferred to be in court. On the contrary, it is easy to find examples of defendants who
move to compel arbitration after being sued in court, even when facing massive potential
liability.88
uncertainty of judicial review of class certification in arbitration and the concomitant fear of a ‘renegade
arbitrator’ certifying a class and exposing a company to massive liability.”).
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Many defendants in high-stake cases are willing to forgo appellate rights to enjoy
the potential benefits of arbitration, including limited discovery, cross-border
enforcement rights, potentially lower litigation costs, confidentiality, and choice of
adjudicators. Justice Scalia also offered no reason why the risk of companies being
forced into “in terrorem” settlements is worse in class arbitrations than in other kinds of
high-stakes arbitrations, or for that matter in class litigation. Whether the risk of a rogue
arbitral tribunal is worse for defendants than the risk of a runaway jury (whose verdict
may or may not be vulnerable on appeal) is far from obvious.
Justice Scalia’s suggestion that even parties that end up in arbitration where large
sums of money are at stake could not have predicted it ex ante is equally unconvincing.
The agreements underlying many enormous commercial transactions often contain
arbitration clauses.89 The sophisticated parties and counsel that negotiate major mergers,
acquisitions, and joint ventures are well aware that disputes might eventually arise out of
these contracts, and that the sums at stake in these disputes can be huge.
True, companies may be particularly hesitant to subject themselves to class
arbitration, as opposed to other types of high stakes arbitration. For example, the amicus
curiae brief of the wireless communication industry’s trade organization, CTIA, in the
Concepcion case claimed that “[t]he arbitration clauses in the terms of service of many
CTIA members expressly provide that their arbitration clauses have no force if the class
waiver is deemed unenforceable.”90 In particular, the service agreements offered by
Sprint and Verizon provided that if the class waiver was held unenforceable, then the
whole arbitration provision would not apply.91 Likewise, after the Ninth Circuit’s
decision below in Concepcion, Comcast announced that it would not seek to enforce its
arbitration agreements with California customers.92 Thus, at least in these cases, the
companies apparently did prefer class litigation over class arbitration.
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Likewise, in Stolt-Nielsen, the Court considered “whether imposing class
arbitration on parties whose arbitration clauses are ‘silent’ on that issue is consistent with
the Federal Arbitration Act.”93 Importantly, that case was not a mass consumer action in
which each potential plaintiff had a small claim. Rather, the Court observed that the
parties, including the claimants, were “sophisticated business entities.”94 The amounts at
stake were not trivial for all the claimants, some of whom might well have had an
incentive to bring suit in an individual capacity. Nonetheless, the respondents opposed
class certification and fought it up to the Supreme Court. For these respondents at least,
class arbitration was undesirable even if the alternative was numerous individual
arbitrations.95
But not so fast. Trade organizations that opposed the Discover Bank rule had
every incentive to demonstrate that it would discourage arbitration. They accordingly
presented several examples of companies that apparently preferred no arbitration at all
over the prospect of class arbitration. But were these companies the exception or the
rule? After all, the California Supreme Court decided Discover Bank in 2005. In the six
years between that ruling and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Concepcion decision, countless
companies drafted customer agreements that included arbitration clauses with class
waivers. Moreover, the California courts were not alone in holding class action waivers
in arbitration clauses unconscionable; numerous state and federal courts elsewhere had
also done so.96 Thus, the lawyers who drafted and vetted consumer contracts of adhesion
were well aware that class waivers in arbitration agreements could be held unenforceable.
However, they continued to include them in numerous consumer agreements, and many
such agreements lacked any provision that voided the entire arbitration agreement if the
class waiver clause were held unconscionable.
The 2013 study by the Consumer Financial Protection Board found that
approximately half the arbitration clauses in consumer credit card agreements and
checking account agreements, and less than 30% of clauses in prepaid payment card
93
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agreements, included “anti-severability” clauses that provided that if the class waiver
were held unenforceable, the entire arbitration clause would be unenforceable.97
Likewise, a 2008 empirical study of major companies contracts found that 8 out of 20
consumer contracts with class arbitration waivers did not contain a provision voiding the
arbitration clause in the event class arbitration was permitted.98 Thus, in the remainder of
the arbitration agreements, the companies subjected themselves to the possibility of class
arbitration (though, post-Concepcion and Italian Colors, the likelihood of such a
company being forced into class arbitration is remote).
In fact, many consumer agreements include severability provisions, which ensure
that the company would still be required to arbitrate even if the class waiver is struck
down—thus making the companies subject to the possibility of class arbitration.99 And
some practitioners have argued that companies may find that class arbitration, whatever
its differences from individual arbitration, nonetheless “may be better than the
alternative” of class litigation.100
Moreover, if a company is really worried about the risks of an adverse class
arbitral award, there may be other safeguards it can put in place. For example, the JAMS
rules of arbitration expressly provide that arbitrators’ decisions on class certification are
“subject to immediate court review.”101 And in late 2013, AAA introduced its own
optional internal appellate mechanism.102
It is thus an open question whether most companies are really averse to the
possibility of class action arbitration, and more generally to high-stakes arbitration. By
relying on this debatable premise, the Supreme Court has sold short the many reasons
why a company might prefer to handle a big-money case via arbitration. The Court’s
claim that arbitration is ill-suited for high-stakes cases would likely be a surprise to the
97
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many practitioners and their clients who arbitrate large-scale disputes every day
throughout the world—and are often grateful to be doing so out of court.
D. The Court Has Discounted the Abilities of Arbitrators
In support of his view that class actions are fundamentally incompatible with
arbitration, Justice Scalia argued in Concepcion that “arbitrators are not generally
knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the
protection of absent parties.”103 This observation is rather condescending to the abilities
of arbitrators and dismissive of the flexibility of arbitration. Arbitrators are frequently
called on to master various new types of law and procedure and to deal with the laws of
numerous jurisdictions around the world. Class actions are not some uniquely arcane
process that is beyond the abilities of experienced arbitrators. Indeed, the opinion itself
acknowledges that the American Arbitration Association has its own class action rules
and has overseen hundreds of class actions.104 Moreover, many arbitrators are
themselves former judges.
The Court’s reliance on arbitrators’ alleged unfamiliarity with class proceedings is
puzzling because in other contexts, the Court has repeatedly acknowledged that
arbitrators’ lack of expertise in an issue is not a legitimate obstacle to the arbitrability of
those issues. In Mitsubishi Motors, the Court “decline[d] to indulge the presumption that
the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain
competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators.”105 More recently, in 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett,106 the same five justices that made up the Concepcion and Italian Colors
majorities disavowed past holdings that “questioned the competence of arbitrators to
decide federal statutory claims.”107 Rather, the majority emphasized that “[a]n
arbitrator’s capacity to resolve complex questions of fact and law extends with equal
force to” statutory antidiscrimination claims.108
Although those cases concerned whether arbitration was appropriate for particular
substantive causes of action rather than for certain types of judicial procedures, there is
no reason why arbitrators are any less capable of administering class proceedings than
they are of handling the enormous range of legal and factual issues that come before
them. As one commentator has argued, “[t]he flexibility and informality of arbitration do
not make it unsuitable for class litigation; quite the contrary. These attributes permit
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arbitrators to implement innovative procedures that courts have been hesitant to
accept.”109
Indeed, in Concepcion, Justice Scalia acknowledged that it was “theoretically
possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise relevant to the class-certification
question.”110 In fact, courts have often cited particularized knowledge as an advantage of
arbitration over litigation. In a 2002 dissent, three members of the Concepcion and
Italian Colors majority, including Justice Scalia, observed that “most arbitrators[] possess
special expertise or knowledge in the area subject to arbitration.”111 Arbitrators can
develop expertise in class proceedings, just as they develop expertise in numerous other
areas of law; the fact that class actions are a procedural mechanism rather than a
“substantive” area of law does not change that. Indeed, a specialized class arbitrator
would likely be at least as skilled at overseeing class proceedings as a generalist judge for
whom class actions are just a small part of a diverse docket.
E. The Recent Rulings May Not Apply to International Agreements
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Concepcion and Italian Colors addressed
whether the FAA overrode state and federal policies that supposedly favored class
proceedings. However, international arbitration agreements are not governed solely by
the FAA, and the Supreme Court’s recent rulings did not discuss whether applied equally
to international agreements governed by the New York Convention, which is the primary
basis for the international enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards. It is far from
clear that a class action waiver in an international arbitration agreement will meet the
same fate in many courts as the provisions that the Supreme Court upheld in its recent
decisions upheld in those two cases.
As of this writing not a single reported case in any U.S. court, state or federal, has
substantially assessed how Concepcion or Italian Colors’ treatment of class proceedings
applies to international arbitration agreements. This is surprising, given that the cases
have been cited in more than a thousand lower court decisions. The courts’ lack of
attention to how Concepcion applies to transnational agreements raises the question
whether the ruling has any implications for international commercial arbitration.
According to some commentators, the answer is no.112 After all, Concepcion involved
domestic consumer disputes, not international commercial disputes. Moreover, class
actions are unusual in an international, non-consumer context (though not unheard of, as
shown by Stolt-Nielson).
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On first impression, one would expect the Supreme Court’s enforcement of class
arbitration waivers to be at least as applicable to international agreements. As the Court
held in Mitsubishi Motors, “the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute
resolution . . . applies with special force in the field of international commerce.”113
Moreover, as the Court has explained, “[t]he goals of the [New York] Convention, and
the principal purpose underlying American adoption and implementation of it, was to
encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial contracts and to unify the
standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced
in the signatory countries.”114 Insofar as the Court has held that a rule requiring class
arbitration “interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration,”115 presumably the same
logic would apply to international agreements. But a close look at the text of the New
York Convention raises questions about such a conclusion.
1. The FAA Versus the New York Convention
The New York Convention—not the FAA—takes precedence in assessing
international arbitration agreements. The federal statute that codifies the New York
Convention provides that the FAA applies to international arbitration agreements “to the
extent that chapter is not in conflict with … the Convention as ratified by the United
States.”116 Thus, as the Second Circuit has explained, “the FAA and the Convention have
‘overlapping coverage’ to the extent that they do not conflict.”117
The question, then, is whether the FAA and the New York Convention conflict in
a way that calls into question whether the Supreme Court’s recent rulings on class
arbitration applies equally to international agreements. This question’s difficulty is
exacerbated by peculiarities in the New York Convention.
2. The New York Convention’s Saving Clause
The FAA and the New York Convention have different saving clauses. Section 2
of the FAA requires the enforcement of arbitration agreements “save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 118 Article II, section 3 of
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the New York Convention requires a court to enforce an arbitration agreement “unless it
finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.”119
The New York Convention’s clause does not contain the FAA’s suggestion that a
court can refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement only on grounds that apply equally to
other types of contracts. This is the language that the Supreme Court has relied on in
holding in Concepcion that a state contract rule cannot render an arbitration agreement
unenforceable under the FAA if the rule is not generally applicable, or if the rule
“disfavors arbitration.”120
A logical corollary of this difference is that under the New York Convention,
legal rules that are not generally applicable can still render an agreement unenforceable.
Rather, as long as an agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed,” it is unenforceable even if the basis for such a finding is a legal rule that is
not generally applicable or one that does supposedly disfavor arbitration. Does the
California Discover Bank rule of unconscionability, or other state or federal laws that
promote aggregation of claims, meet that standard?
Some courts have appeared to assume that, as a general matter, an unconscionable
arbitration agreement can be “null and void” under Article II(3) of the Convention. In
2005, the Eleventh Circuit characterized an argument that an agreement was
unconscionable as “a ‘null and void’ claim” under the Convention.121 In 2008, the Ninth
Circuit assumed arguendo that “unconscionability renders an agreement ‘null and void’
under the Convention,” before going on to hold that the arbitration agreement at issue
was not unconscionable in any event.122 And in 1996, the Northern District of California
considered a claim that an “agreement to arbitrate is ‘null and void’ because it is
unconscionable.”123 None of the courts delved deeply into whether an unconscionable
contract should really be considered “null and void” under the Convention, because in
each case it was unnecessary: the courts all found that the agreements in question were
not unconscionable in any event.
Moreover, outside the New York Convention context, an array of state and federal
courts in the U.S. have held that an unconscionable contract is null and void.124 But
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courts have recognized that they do not have great leeway to find agreements
unenforceable under Article II(3) of the Convention, particularly with respect to the “null
and void” language. As the Third Circuit has explained, “[t]he ‘null and void’ language
must be read narrowly, for the signatory nations [to the N.Y. Convention] have jointly
declared a general policy of enforceability of agreements to arbitrate.”125 The District
Court for the District of Columbia observed in 2007 that “[f]ederal courts have
consistently found that the ‘null and void’ language in Article II(3) is to be narrowly
construed.”126
Following these principles, the D.C. District Court refused to recognize
unconscionability as a basis for invalidating an international arbitration agreement,
holding that “unconscionability is not—and indeed cannot be—a recognized defense to
the enforceability of arbitration agreements falling under the N.Y. Convention.”127 The
court reasoned that “while public policy and discretion of the courts may be a
predominant characteristic of domestic arbitration, international arbitration requires
certainty to ensure unified standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and
arbitral awards are enforced.”128
The court concluded that “the defense of
unconscionability seeks to promote those very tenets that are contrary to a finding of
certainty, namely: policy, fairness, and appeals to a court’s discretion outside of the letter
of the law.”129
That decision was something of an outlier, however. As Gary Born explains, it
“ignores the fact that unconscionability is a well-settled ground for contractual invalidity
in virtually all jurisdictions.”130 Most jurisdictions worldwide have recognized that
unconscionability is a legitimate ground for refusing to recognize the validity of a
contract.131 Indeed, even in Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that
A.2d 113, 117 (Conn. 1945) (if “unconscionable advantage has been taken of [a mortgagor] . . ., the
transaction will be treated as null and void”); see also McAlpine v. McAlpine, 650 So.2d 1142, 1147-48
(La. 1995) (Kimball, J., dissenting) (“If a post-separation agreement waiving alimony were unconscionable
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unconscionability could be a valid ground for refusing to enforce an arbitration
agreement.132
However, while unconscionability might theoretically be a basis for holding an
arbitration agreement null and void under the New York Convention, it is a high bar to
clear. Although arbitration agreements could still be held unconscionable under the FAA
post-Concepcion, the decision significantly narrowed the grounds under which this was
possible.133
The determination whether a state rule against class action waivers can survive
Concepcion in international agreements necessarily implicates important choice-of-law
questions. After all, if federal law governs the validity of international agreements, then
the state rule is inapplicable even if the Convention’s saving clause does differ from the
FAA’s. The Second Circuit has held that in cases arising out of the New York
Convention, “we have compelling reasons to apply federal law, which is already welldeveloped, to the question of whether an agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.”134
Moreover, U.S. courts are split on whether state law or federal law should govern in
unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements in cases where the FAA
governs.135
But the vast majority of U.S. courts that have assessed international arbitration
agreements under Article II(3) have applied neither state nor federal common law
principles of contract formation, but have rather applied international law.136 The
Provisions: A History of Unenforceability from Roman Law to the UCC, 42 TUL. L. REV. 193, 193 (1967)
(“The beginnings of the unconscionability concept go back at least as far as the Roman law . . . .”).
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majority of courts in other countries have done so as well, although some authorities have
applied national law.137 The First Circuit explained in 1982 that “the clause must be
interpreted to encompass only those situations—such as fraud, mistake, duress, and
waiver—that can be applied neutrally on an international scale.”138 Likewise, in 1983 the
Third Circuit held that “an agreement to arbitrate is ‘null and void’ only (1) when it is
subject to an internationally recognized defense such as duress, mistake, fraud, or waiver,
or (2) when it contravenes fundamental policies of the forum state.”139 As discussed,
unconscionability is a widely recognized contract defense and does contravene
fundamental policies of most if not all jurisdictions. But whether international standards
can encompass the particular holdings of the courts of California and many other
places—but by no means all other jurisdictions—that class arbitration waivers in
consumer contracts of adhesion are unconscionable is a much more difficult question.
But as discussed in the next section, answering that question may not even be
necessary.
3. The New York Convention’s Other Saving clause
To make matters more complicated, the “null and void” provision in Article II,
section 3 is not the only saving clause in the New York Convention. Rather, under
Article V, section 1(a), a court may refuse to recognize or enforce an arbitral award if
“the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or,
failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was
made.”140 Thus, the Convention contains one saving clause (Article II(3)) relating to the
enforceability of an agreement at the initial stage of an arbitration, and a separate,
differently worded clause (Article V(1)(a)) at the award stage. This is an odd feature of
the Convention, and is less likely the result of a deliberate plan than of the vagaries of the
drafting of the Convention.141
Moreover, insofar as the Convention provides choice-of-law guidance as to the
enforceability of agreements, that guidance is found in Article V(1)(a) rather than Article
II(3), which is silent on the question. Indeed, some authorities, when making a choice-oflaw determination under Article II(3), have even looked to the language in Article
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V(1)(a) in making that determination.142 Unless we want courts to apply differing law
depending on the stage of the proceeding—which would be a vast waste of energy and
likely was not the intent of the Convention’s drafters—the choice of law principle
outlined in Article V(1)(a) is the most logical one to use at both the agreementrecognition stage and the award-recognition stage.143 Although some courts have held
otherwise,144 this is the most sensible solution.
If anything, Article V(1)(a) of the Convention is friendlier to local legal rules than
Article II(3) is. Article V(1)(a) expressly refers to (i) the governing law to which the
parties subjected the arbitration agreement, or (ii) absent such governing law, the arbitral
seat. Moreover, Article V(1)(a)—like Article II(3) and unlike the FAA—does not restrict
non-enforcement of arbitral agreements only to generally applicable rules that apply to all
contracts. Thus, if Article V(1)(a) governs international agreements, then it is entirely
possible that a local rule limiting class action waivers might be upheld, even if the same
rule does not survive FAA preemption in the domestic context.
If an arbitration agreement with a class waiver has a California choice-of-law
provision,145 the analysis may be relatively straightforward if Article V(1)(a) governs.
Under California law, the provision is unenforceable because it is unconscionable. The
fact that the FAA preempts the law does not change this result, since Article V(1)(a)’s
broader recognition of local law will trump the FAA’s narrower tolerance only for
generally applicable state rules.
Most arbitration clauses in commercial contracts do not contain choice-of-law
provisions. Moreover, authorities in the U.S. and elsewhere are split on whether a
choice-of-law provision in an underlying contract—but not part of the arbitration clause
within that contract—governs the arbitration agreement.146 If a court or arbitral panel
decides that an arbitration agreement is not subject to a choice-of-law clause in the
contract itself, then under Article V(1)(a), the applicable law is the “law of the country
where the award was made.”147 If an arbitration is seated in California—perhaps
pursuant to a clause similar to the one in Concepcion that provided that the arbitration
would take place in the county of the claimant’s residence148—and an award is rendered
there, California law could apply.
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Although Article V(1)(a) refers to “the law of the country where the award was
made,” a court or arbitrator might conclude that framers of the Convention did not have
federalism principles in mind when they drafted this language, and that the law of the
arbitral seat, including the state law, should govern. This conclusion would be bolstered
by the fact that the “law to which the parties have subjected it” language immediately
preceding is not limited to national law, and there is little reason to think that the first part
of the saving clause was intended to apply state law while the second part was not.
One might counter that the governing state contract law should nonetheless be
inapplicable insofar as it is itself invalidated by the international pro-enforcement
principles inherent in the New York Convention. However, the Convention recognizes
that local legal principles can be applied to determinations of the validity of arbitral
awards. True, it would not be in the spirit of the Convention to enforce a local rule that
drastically limits the enforceability of awards. Interpreting Article V(1)(a) in this way
would risk allowing the saving clause to swallow up the rest of the Convention. But
Article V(1)(a)’s choice-of-law language allows a good deal of room for differences
among jurisdictions. This space could easily encompass local principles like California’s
Discover Bank rule.
***
All this is not to say that it is realistically likely that the current majority on the
Supreme Court would uphold a Discover Bank-type rule as applied to arbitration
agreements governed by the New York Convention. Having held that class arbitration is
not consistent with its view of the fundamental nature of arbitration—and in light of its
recognition in Mitsubishi Motors that “the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral
dispute resolution . . . applies with special force in the field of international
commerce”149—the majority would likely make quick work of a state rule against class
arbitration waivers in international agreements.
But until that time, it far from implausible that a lower court that has traditionally
been less supportive of arbitration—say, the California courts or their federal
counterparts in the Ninth Circuit—might invoke the differing language of the New York
Convention’s saving clause(s) and refuse to enforce a class arbitration waiver in an
international agreement. The fact that the state law is preempted by the FAA would not
be relevant, insofar as the saving clauses of the FAA and the Convention conflict. Courts
would have a strong argument for doing so, because the New York Convention—
particularly Article V(1)(a)—is, on its face, arguably more receptive than the FAA to
local rules of arbitral contract validity.150 The unusual possibility that an arbitral clause
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that is enforceable under the FAA could be invalid under the New York Convention is
yet another indication that the recent decisions on class arbitration have left a
complicated legacy.
F. The Decisions Sent an Anti-Arbitration Message to Other Countries and
Arbitral Institutions
Apart from highlighting possible conflicts between the FAA and the New York
Convention, the U.S. Supreme Court’s view of class arbitration also sends an important
message to other countries about the limitations of arbitration. When the United States’
highest court says that class proceedings are incompatible with the fundamental nature of
arbitration, it sends a signal to the rest of the world that arbitration need not provide for
class proceedings.
The Concepcion and Italian Colors decisions are particularly striking in an
international context, because they run counter to the trend in other countries, which have
been moving toward class arbitration—even though, for many countries, the idea of class
proceedings in arbitration or litigation is a relatively new one.151 For example, in 2011,
the Supreme Court of Canada refused to enforce a class-waiver provision in an arbitration
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agreement similar to the one in Concepcion.152 To the extent U.S. courts now begin to
move away from appreciating the benefits of class actions, other countries may follow.
Likewise, the Supreme Court’s aversion to multiparty arbitration sets back the
cause of multiparty arbitration in international proceedings. In the investor-state context,
one of the most noted arbitral decisions of recent years was the jurisdictional award in
Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, where for the first time an ICSID tribunal allowed a group
of 60,000 individual claimants to join together to bring a claim against Argentina. 153 But
unlike the AAA and JAMS rules, no major international arbitral institution has
procedural rules for class arbitration. Even the ICDR, the international counterpart to
AAA, does not provide for class proceedings in its rules.154 International institutions are
less likely to facilitate class arbitrations where national courts suggest that they are not
really arbitrations in the first place.155
G. The Legislative Backlash
The Supreme Court’s treatment of class arbitration also threatens to undermine
arbitration by prompting a populist backlash.156 Writing in the New York Times, one
legal historian went so far as to analogize the use of arbitration in consumer disputes to
the watered-down courts “established in the Reconstruction South to provide justice to
the recently freed slaves.”157
Days after the Concepcion ruling, several members of Congress reintroduced the
federal “Arbitration Fairness Act,”158 which had seen previous iterations in 2007 and
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2009. The Act was introduced yet again in 2013, after the oral argument in Italian
Colors. Although the passage of something like the Arbitration Fairness Act in the near
future is unlikely given the current conditions in Washington, its repeated introduction
shows how the Concepcion and Italian Colors decisions invite an eventual legislative
response.
The 2013 iteration of the Arbitration Fairness Act would render invalid and
unenforceable any “predispute arbitration agreement” that requires arbitration of an
employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute.”159 The
“findings” in the Act state that its purpose is to revitalize the original intention of the
FAA, which was to recognize arbitration agreements “between commercial entities of
generally similar sophistication and bargaining power.”160 However, the definitions in
the law are so broad that they can easily cover many cases where the parties are all
“entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power.” For example, the Act
defines “employment dispute” as “a dispute between an employer and employee arising
out of the relationship of employer and employee as defined in section 3 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.”161 This can encompass high-ranking corporate executives in
major corporations, who would have considerable means and access to high-priced
counsel.
The Arbitration Fairness Act, if enacted, would do far more to limit the use of
arbitration than contrary rulings in Concepcion or Italian Colors would have, because the
Act would invalidate the vast majority of agreements that are currently subject to
mandatory arbitration. American companies are significantly more likely to include
arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts and employment contracts than in their
contracts with other businesses.162
Moreover, the Act, if enacted into law, might well violate the New York
Convention and could thus disrupt the entire worldwide system of mutual enforcement
and comity among signatory nations. As discussed, federal law provides that, to the
extent the FAA and the New York Convention conflict, the latter controls with respect to
arbitration agreements subject to the Convention.163 This provision avoids any risk that
the mandates of the FAA would violate the U.S.’s treaty obligations. However, the
Arbitration Fairness Act contains no such provision. Rather, the Act is silent as to how to
handle conflicts between it and the Convention. This would pose dilemmas for a court
confronted with an international arbitration agreement that is subject to the Convention
but clearly unenforceable under the Arbitration Fairness Act—for example, the
employment contract of an American executive of a foreign corporation, or a foreigner
who purchases a vacation home in the U.S.
159
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Moreover, with American mass retailers shipping to overseas customers, eventual
disputes over the enforceability of arbitration agreements between American companies
and foreign customers are inevitable.164 A court confronted with this conflict might well
decline to enforce the agreement in question, on the longstanding principle that where
two laws conflict, “the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal
of the earlier one.”165 If U.S. courts start to do this, it could encourage other countries to
pass national legislation that does the same.
Of course, the fact that Congress might eventually amend the FAA to counteract
the Supreme Court’s class arbitration decisions does not itself mean that these cases were
wrongly decided. But for those who believe in the many benefits of arbitration,
particularly in the international commercial context, the resulting backlash could
undermine arbitration in contexts where it is widely agreed to be appropriate, fair, and
consensual.
H. The Regulatory Backlash
Legislators are not the only branch of the federal government that is trying to
countervail Concepcion’s effect. Several federal regulatory agencies have also opposed
companies’ efforts to require individual arbitration.
1. Shareholder Suits
The most successful, and ironic, of these regulatory pushbacks is the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s effort with respect to shareholder litigation. In September
2011, the Carlyle Group, a major private equity firm, filed documents with the SEC
indicating its intention to sell its shares to the public for the first time.166 Four months
later, Carlyle filed an amendment that would require public shareholders to arbitrate all
disputes with the company, and would bar all class or consolidated actions.167
Carlyle’s filing faced furious opposition from plaintiffs’ lawyers, 168 several U.S.
Senators who have been critical of arbitration,169 and—most importantly—the SEC. The

164

See, e.g., S. Clifford, U.S. Stores Learn How to Ship to Foreign Shoppers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2012)
(discussing various American companies that are “trying to extend [their] international presence to [their]
Web operations by shipping overseas”), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/business/usstores-learn-the-ropes-of-shipping-to-foreign-shoppers.html?_r=0
165

Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).

166

Gregory Zuckerman, Carlyle Gets Set for Stock Debut, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 2011), available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111904900904576554260537365344.
167

S.M. Davidoff, Carlyle Readies an Unfriendly I.P.O. for Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 18,
2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/carlyle-readies-an-unfriendly-i-p-o-for-shareholders; Miles
Weiss, Carlyle Seeks to Ban Shareholder Lawsuits Before Public Offering, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 18,
2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-18/carlyle-seeks-to-ban-shareholder-lawsuits-beforeinitial-public-offering.html.
168

See SEC SHOULD REJECT CARLYLE’S ATTACK ON INVESTOR RIGHTS, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR
JUSTICE (2012), http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/justice/hs.xsl/17674.htm.

249

Commission’s opposition followed its longstanding policy against allowing public
companies to require arbitration of federal securities law claims.170 This policy reflects,
in part, decisions by some courts holding that agreements to arbitrate such claims are
unenforceable.171
Faced with the SEC’s stark opposition—which threatened to hold up Carlyle’s
public offering—Carlyle backed off quickly and removed the arbitration clause and class
waiver from its IPO filing documents.172 This reversal disappointed those who would
have liked to see the issue litigated.173 Indeed, it is far from clear that the SEC would
prevail in such a case.174 And it may not be long before another company takes the SEC
to court rather than accede to its policy.175
The continuing survival of a rule against arbitration clauses and class waivers in
the securities filing context is a paradoxical result of Italian Colors and Concepcion. If
169
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there is one kind of class action to which Congress has been most hostile in recent years,
it is shareholder actions.176 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
imposed heightened pleading requirements and other restrictions on claims brought under
the Exchange Act of 1934.177 The law was passed to curtail “the routine filing of
lawsuits against issuers of securities and others whenever there is a significant change in
an issuer’s stock price, without regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and
with only faint hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible
cause of action.”178 That shareholder securities actions are now particularly shielded
against mandatory arbitration and class waivers is odd to say the least.179
2. Labor Claims
The National Labor Relations Board—albeit much less successfully—has also
tried to limit arbitration agreements barring class proceedings. On January 3, 2012, the
NLRB ruled unlawful any employment agreement that bars employees “from filing joint,
class, or collective claims addressing their wages, hours or other working conditions
against the employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial.”180 The Board found that such
agreements conflict with employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act to “to
engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection.”181 The Board found that its decision did not conflict with the FAA
because it did not disfavor arbitration in particular: “To find that an arbitration agreement
must yield to the NLRA is to treat it no worse than any other private contract that
conflicts with Federal labor law.”182
Given Concepcion and other recent FAA jurisprudence, the NLRB’s rationale
was unlikely to survive challenge in court. And indeed, in late 2013, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the NLRB’s decision, holding that “[t]he use of class action procedures … is not
a substantive right” safeguarded under the NLRA and that the NLRA did not override the
176
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FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements.183 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit was
just one of multiple other lower courts that had also distinguished or declined to follow
the NLRB’s analysis.184
3. Consumer Financial Products
The 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reform law, enacted before the Concepcion and
Italian Colors decisions, included a provision authorizing the new federal Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau to “prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of
an agreement between a covered person and a consumer for a consumer financial product
or service providing for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties, if the
Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations is in the
public interest and for the protection of consumers.”185
Two years later the CFPB launched an initial inquiry into the use of arbitration
clauses in customer contracts for financial products and services.186 Among other things,
the CFPB’s study examined the use of class action waivers in arbitration agreements. As
discussed above, the CFBB’s 168-page report on its “Preliminary Results,” issued in
December 2013, found that class waivers are a nearly universal part of arbitration
agreements.187
Whether the CFPB’s statutory authorization and report will eventually lead to
regulatory restrictions on arbitration agreements remains to be seen. But if the CFPB
eventually declines to regulate any aspect of consumer financial arbitration clauses, its
leadership will likely face hard questions from the Congressional members who passed
Dodd-Frank in the wake of the 2008 financial collapse.
***
The SEC’s actions in particular show that certain types of private class actions
may withstand the Supreme Court’s recent class arbitration jurisprudence where a
particular federal agency acts as its protector. It is difficult to discern a clear policy
reason why certain actions require class proceedings, whereas numerous other types of
claims would be subject to class arbitration waivers. But that is the effect of Italian
Colors and Concepcion, which enforce class-opt-out clauses, except when they don’t.
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I. The Judicial Backlash
Most audaciously, elements in the third branch of government have also taken
steps to limit the effect of the Supreme Court’s class arbitration rulings. Though all
lower courts in the United States are, of course, bound by the Supreme Court’s
pronouncements on federal law, many such courts have begun to find ways around the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions.188 As of March 2014, more than seventy lower courts
have cited Concepcion in a ruling but avoided applying it or otherwise recognized its
limited effect by declining to extend it, distinguishing it, or recognizing that other courts
had done so.189 Out of the 85 cases decided in the Supreme Court’s 2010 term, only four
others have garnered more “negative” references by lower courts.190
To take a few examples: In Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., the Ninth Circuit
held that an employer’s arbitration policy was unconscionable under California law,
notwithstanding Concepcion, and allowed a putative class action to go forward. 191 In
Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that, the FAA did not preempt Maryland
law requiring independent consideration for an arbitration clause.192 And in In re
Checking Account Overdraft Litigation MDL No. 2036, the Eleventh Circuit held that a
fee-shifting provision was unconscionable under South Carolina law.193
These rulings do not, of course, override the Supreme Court’s decisions.
Numerous lower courts that tried to distinguish or refused to extend Concepcion and
Italian Colors have seen their rulings reversed, vacated, or abrogated.194 And hundreds
of courts have faithfully followed the guidance provided in Concepcion and Italian
Colors. But the unusually large number of courts that have sought to distinguish or
otherwise avoid applying these decisions suggest that there is judicial resistance to their
full application. Since only a tiny percentage of cases ever make their way to the
Supreme Court, lower courts’ reluctance to fully embrace the Supreme Court’s strict
enforcement of class arbitration waivers may have a limiting effect on the practical effect
of the recent decisions.
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J. Conclusion
Superficially, the Supreme Court’s recent class arbitration cases favored
arbitration by protecting one type of arbitration clause against state and federal legal
principles that would have held it unenforceable. Moreover, class arbitration is no
panacea for people with small claims. Commentators have noted that class arbitration
does have problems, including potential due process concerns.195 But while the Supreme
Court’s recent decisions on class arbitration held themselves out as promoting arbitration,
there are many reasons to believe that the rulings’ reasoning and effect will ultimately
contribute—both in the U.S. and internationally—to the undermining of arbitration as a
versatile tool for the resolution of disputes. In purporting to further the pro-arbitration
goals of federal law, the Court ironically undercut and underestimated the potential of
arbitration in many ways.
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